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MANDATED MEDIOCRITY: MODERNIZING
EDUCATION LAW BY REDUCING
MANDATES AND INCREASING
PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION
Shavar D. Jeffries*
“[S]chools have not changed since their design nearly a
century ago, when the economic rage was the mass pro-
duction system.  In this factory model of education, stu-
dents are viewed as products, teachers as assembly
workers, and school administrators as floor super-
visors.”
—Adam Urbanski, former high-school teacher
and local teacher’s union president.1
“[T]here are no uniform answers. . . .  You have to ask
yourself, what is the right answer for a particular situa-
tion and school.”
—Anthony Alvarado, San Diego school administrator.2
Public education in the United States is a favorite target of ambi-
tious policymakers.  Repeated rounds of reform have attempted to mod-
ernize public schools by imposing new mandates—new tests, new
curricular requirements, new teacher training.  But rather than being
helpful steps forward, these efforts simply reiterate the nineteenth-cen-
tury assembly-line approach to public schooling.  Mandates constrain
the discretion of teachers, standardizing instructors with the goal of
churning out standardized students.  This Article argues that policymak-
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1 Adam Urbanski, Real Change is Real Hard: Lessons Learned in Rochester, 4 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 123, 123–24 (1992–1993).
2 James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183, 223 (2003).
45
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-1\CJP102.txt unknown Seq: 2 19-NOV-13 9:38
46 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:45
ers would better foster educational achievement by restricting the man-
dates they impose on public schools.  I distinguish between regulatory-
zone subjects, which generally are appropriate to address with man-
dates, and discretionary-zone subjects, which generally are not appro-
priate to address with mandates.
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IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETION TO EFFECTIVE MODERN-DAY
EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 R
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INTRODUCTION
Mandates are an unmistakable feature of public schooling in the
United States.  Across-the-board directives dictate educational practice
on matters affecting the entire scope of school operations.  These rules
heavily constrain the discretion of staff at the school level to make judg-
ments about the best means of meeting the needs of individual students.3
These mandates affect virtually all school functions, including fun-
damental decisions about hiring, selecting, retaining, and promoting
staff.  Rules, for example, limit the pool of teachers and administrators to
those who have passed specified benchmark tests and taken prescribed
coursework, even though these requirements have little demonstrated re-
lationship to effective practice.4  Mandates limit the classrooms to which
staff can be assigned, superseding school-based discretion to match staff
to individual student needs.5  Mandates specify in minute detail the terms
of teacher and administrator evaluation, constraining school-based dis-
cretion to assess performance based on school-specific and student-spe-
cific priorities.6  Mandates dictate the terms of staff compensation,
usually requiring lockstep pay regardless of an individual educator’s
3 By “mandate,” I mean any obligation imposed on individual schools or districts for
which applicable law demands compliance.  I will use the term “rule” interchangeably with
“mandate,” so I thus do not intend to refer to rules in their narrow, administrative sense, but in
a less formal sense to encompass those external duties requiring compliance.  In this way,
legally enforceable mandates or rules can be reduced to the term law, since it is legal sanction
that compels compliance with a particular mandate.  This definition, finally, focuses on the
existence of the mandate and its substance, and not the source of it.  As discussed throughout
the paper, my focus here is on mandates themselves and the discretion they remove from
individual schools and districts, not the particular external author of the rule.
4 See, e.g., Thomas Kane et al., What Does Certification Tell Us About Teacher Effec-
tiveness?  Evidence from New York City 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 12155, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12155.pdf.
5 See, e.g., JESSICA LEVIN ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, UNINTENDED CONSE-
QUENCES: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE STAFFING RULES IN URBAN TEACHERS UNION CON-
TRACTS 40 (2005), available at http://tntp.org/assets/documents/UnintendedConsequences.pdf
(finding that rules regarding school staffing “undermine [school-level] efforts to hire and keep
the teachers they believe can best meet the needs of their students.”).
6 See DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT:
OUR NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER EFFEC-
TIVENESS 10, 24 (2009), available at http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/TheWidgetEffect.pdf
(noting that “teacher evaluation systems devalue instructional effectiveness by generating per-
formance information that reflects virtually no variation among teachers at all” and this scar-
city of information “severely limit[s] the ability of schools . . . to consider performance when
answering critical questions or making strategic decisions about their teacher workforce.”).
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ability to meet school-specific or student-specific needs.7  Mandates dic-
tate retention, promotion, and layoff practices, usually through rigid se-
niority and tenure rules that preempt discretion, undermining
administrators’ ability to retain staff based on demonstrated effectiveness
in meeting individual student needs.8
Rule-based uniformity also governs core functions of teaching and
learning.  Lockstep directives, for example, limit public schools’ aca-
demic programs to a specific number of hours and days, thereby preclud-
ing schools from using the school day and year flexibly to meet diverse
student needs.9  Mandates governing permissible textbooks and instruc-
tional materials preempt school-based educators’ authority to use their
professional judgment to select the particular instructional tools best
suited to engaging particular students.10  Even basic teaching practices
are subject to rule-based standardization, as government increasingly re-
quires schools to use scripted, off-the-shelf curricula that specify instruc-
tional practice on a minute-by-minute basis.11  These mandates preempt
more individualized, discretionary practice, substituting the wisdom of
an across-the-board directive for classroom and school-level professional
judgment.
This discretion-stripping was arguably reasonable, historically,
given the motivations informing public schools for much of American
history.  Traditionally, public schools sought to instill in students a basic
set of low-level skills and to inculcate civic values that were deemed
essential to fostering a common American cultural identity.12  Nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century labor markets did not require large
7 See JULIE KOWAL ET AL., CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, TEACHER COMPENSATION IN
CHARTER AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS: SNAPSHOTS AND LESSONS FOR DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOLS 4
(2007), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/02/pdf/
teacher_compensation.pdf.
8 See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
9 See, e.g., Dave E. Marcotte & Benjamin Hansen, Time for School?, EDUC. NEXT,
Winter 2010, at 52, 59, available at http://educationnext.org/files/ednext_20101_52.pdf (not-
ing that “a small number of schools and districts are modifying or extending the academic
year. . . . However, such initiatives remain rare, with no systemic change in the instructional
time. . . .”).
10 See MATTHEW M. CHINGOS & GROVER J. “RUSS” WHITEHURST, BROWN CTR. ON
EDUC. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, CHOOSING BLINDLY: INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS, TEACHER EF-
FECTIVENESS AND THE COMMON CORE 1 (2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/me
dia/research/files/reports/2012/4/10%20curriculum%20chingos%20whitehurst/0410_curricu
lum_chingos_whitehurst.pdf; AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., EXTENDING EDUCATIONAL REFORM:
FROM ONE SCHOOL TO MANY 20 (2002); JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW ch. 7–R1, tbl.17
(2013) (describing various textbook-related mandates).
11 See, e.g., Barbara Beatty, The Dilemma of Scripted Instruction: Comparing Teacher
Autonomy, Fidelity, and Resistance in the Froebelian Kindergarten, Montessori, Direct In-
struction, and Success for All, 113 TCHRS. C. REC. 395, 397 (2011) (discussing use of scripted,
discretion preempting curricula, and teachers’ reactions to such autonomy stripping).
12 See infra Part I.A.
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numbers of workers with higher-level skills of complex reasoning and
analysis, and public school instruction, likewise, reflected these limited
expectations.13  For much of the twentieth century, barely 5% of jobs
required special skills necessitating education beyond high school,14 and
so high school graduation, let alone college graduation, was a luxury
reserved for a precious few15—the proverbial “reading, writing, and
‘rithmetic” was all that was intended for the masses.16
This low-level skill orientation, moreover, was amenable to then-
prevailing industrial production methods that emphasized uniformity,
repetition, and compartmentalization as prime virtues of organizational
management.  The industrial age assembly line dominated early twenti-
eth-century thoughts about governance, and these methods well served
the limited objectives of public schools.  Low civic expectations, and
labor-market requirements, for the skill level of public school graduates,
coupled with factory-line operational practices,17 produced a system of
public schools that were designed to uniformly produce fungible stu-
dents, with each possessing basic skills and common understandings
about American culture.
Even if this model was reasonably effective in meeting the goals it
was designed for, this traditional design is ill suited to meet the demands
of today’s parents and citizens and to the needs of present-day labor mar-
kets.  Globalization and technological innovation together have dramati-
cally increased the need for higher-skill graduates. Globalization means
that firms no longer limit themselves to domestic markets for workers,
investment, and purchases—instead searching throughout the globe for
the most profitable returns on their investments.18  Continuous innova-
tions in information technology and production methods require individ-
uals to learn more, faster, and to permanently and adaptably pursue
knowledge, as global competition and innovation continually reshape la-
bor markets.19
13 Id.
14 LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 2 (2010).
15 KATHLEEN STASSEN BERGER, THE DEVELOPING PERSON THROUGH CHILDHOOD AND
ADOLESCENCE 480 (6th ed. 2003).
16 See, e.g., FREDERICK M. HESS, THE SAME THING OVER AND OVER: HOW SCHOOL
REFORMERS GOT STUCK IN YESTERDAY’S IDEAS 21–22 (2010).
17 Id. at 104.
18 See Fareed Zakaria, The New Crisis of Democracy, FAREED ZAKARIA (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://fareedzakaria.com/2013/01/11/the-new-crisis-of-democracy (“Technology and global-
ization have made it possible to do simple manufacturing anywhere, and Americans will not be
able to compete for jobs against workers in China and India who are being paid a tenth of the
wages that they are.”).  See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1st updated and expanded ed. 2006) (examining
globalization and its effect on business and employment).
19 See infra Part II.A.
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Policymakers and their constituents today thus expect public
schools to prepare students for this dynamic, global economy, where the
higher-order skills of thinking, writing, and critical reasoning are pri-
mary, and where the capacity to nimbly adapt to change and innovation
are indispensable.  As one bit of evidence, in contrast, as noted above, to
early twentieth century labor markets where barely 5% of jobs required
specialized skills necessitating education past high school, 75% of to-
day’s jobs do, and a large proportion require university degrees, in addi-
tion to ongoing post-baccalaureate training.20  The kind of education
needed for today’s students, simply put, is radically different than the
one needed historically.
But law and governance have failed to keep up.  America’s public
schools remain moored to traditional practices misaligned with current
needs.  Traditional rule-based governance preempts the more nimble,
creative, and organic interplay of professional educator and student,
which is essential for students to learn the higher-order skills now ex-
pected of them.  Teaching and learning is an organic, interactive process
requiring ongoing alignment of curriculum and pedagogy to the ever-
evolving and diverse needs of each child.  Each child’s receptivity to
learning is affected by a range of cultural, social, and personality factors
that manifest themselves in unique ways in each child on each day, and
often in each minute of each day.  In addition, each child enters a class-
room daily with a different knowledge base, and thus with diverse capac-
ities to understand and internalize instruction.  In the context of present-
day needs for graduates with higher-order skills and post-secondary
training, the most effective teaching requires constant discerning of a
child’s receptivity to instruction, and constant adaptation of instructional
methods to these ever-changing needs.21
Traditional mandates, however, preempt this sort of teaching.
Lockstep personnel rules, for example, preclude both the hiring of the
professionals possessing the higher-order skills needed to deliver the
kind of organic teaching kids today require and, at the same time, ignore
current labor markets and thus poorly position schools for recruiting the
most talented graduates into teaching.  Lockstep rules also preclude
schools from using the school day in ways that meet the individualized
needs of students in a particular school or from grouping kids in learning
communities that flexibly respond to kids’ changing needs.  Likewise for
rigid rules concerning textbook use, class size, student grouping, and va-
rious other practices that preclude principals and teachers from flexibly
and nimbly addressing individual student needs.
20 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 2. R
21 See infra Part II.
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The problem, to be clear, is not with any particular rule or with rules
generally.  Rules are important and sometimes necessary.  Instead, the
harm arises from an approach to school law that overemphasizes man-
dates and under-appreciates professional discretion.  This mandates-first
approach causes policymakers too often to impose rules in contexts in
which greater professionalization is better suited to achieve the goals
policymakers seek.
In place of mandate-based governance that often ignores the auton-
omy-stripping implications of uniformity for teaching and learning, this
Article reframes school governance around professionalization, while
preserving a residual space for mandates for those purposes for which
uniformity is essential.  My version of professionalized school govern-
ance requires policymakers to affirmatively consider the benefits and
costs of mandates on educator discretion as a threshold matter, before
engaging the merits of a particular policy choice.  Unlike prevailing rule-
based governance, in which the benefits of mandates are assumed with-
out sufficiently purposeful consideration, my suggested approach re-
quires policymakers to first evaluate whether the subject area under
consideration is one appropriate for regulation.  In this analysis, I differ-
entiate between what I call “regulatory-zone subjects,” for which man-
dates are appropriate, and “discretionary-zone subjects,” for which they
are not.
Regulatory-zone subjects prototypically include matters involving
fundamental public values that apply to all government institutions, like
non-discrimination, and matters involving fundamental public values
unique to education, like goal-setting in terms of the skills and perspec-
tives public school children ought to learn.  Regulatory-zone subjects
also include a limited set of best practices for which there is negligible
professional dissent about the universal effectiveness of a particular prac-
tice, as well as mandate-making on a temporary, emergent basis where
strong evidence shows that particular staff members are simply incapable
of using professional discretion effectively.  Discretionary-zone subjects,
on the other hand, cover essentially everything else, empowering profes-
sional educators to have much more autonomy than is available today for
the means employed to fulfill the goals set by regulatory-zone mandates.
After evaluating the subject-matter appropriateness of regulation,
rule makers should consider scope, tailoring rules purposefully in ways
that further legitimate regulatory purposes without unduly impinging
upon those areas that ought to be reserved to school-based discretion.  By
purposefully considering subject-matter appropriateness and scope, the
kind of modernized school governance I call for will both reduce the
number of rules specifying education practice and, more importantly, al-
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locate rules in intentional ways to those areas that maximize their bene-
fits and minimize their costs.
Part I below discusses the history of mandates and standardization
in public schools, summarizing the focus on uniformity and assembly-
line production methods characterizing the Common School and Progres-
sive Eras when the foundations were laid for today’s public schools.
This Part also describes more recent efforts to reform public schools
through race-neutral student assignment, increased funding, program-
matic reforms, and the current standards-and-testing movement.  None of
these modern initiatives revisit the mandate-based foundations under-
girding American public schools—in fact, new mandates encompassing
new priorities are often grafted onto pre-existing ones.  Finally, Part I
describes impulses intrinsic to the modern regulatory state that impel
policymakers to impose mandates.  Taken together, these historic and
contemporary factors produce a modern set of public schools that are
substantially constrained by externally imposed, legally enforceable
mandates.
Part II describes the degree to which a substantial amount of profes-
sional discretion is required, at the school and classroom level, to achieve
the objectives of modern public schools, which are dramatically bolder
than those motivating public schools traditionally.  This Part describes
the diverse factors affecting the availability and receptivity of each indi-
vidual student to instruction, and summarizes the importance of mean-
ingful school-level autonomy to flexibly address these diverse and
evolving needs, given the ambitious goals of today’s schools.  Part II
argues further that policymakers generally ignore the relationship of
mandates to discretion, and thus both regulate matters that should be bet-
ter left to school- or classroom-level discretion, or, even where a particu-
lar subject matter should be regulated, craft mandates that sweep
indiscriminately and counterproductively beyond their appropriate scope.
Part III, finally, offers a theory that balances mandates and discre-
tion in a way that recognizes the benefits of both mandates and discre-
tion.  This theory differentiates between regulatory-zone subject matter
and discretionary-zone subject matter, recognizing mandates as most ap-
propriate for fulfilling four discrete purposes: (1) identifying the objec-
tives of public schools, (2) anchoring schools to fundamental public
priorities, (3) rooting educational methods in indisputably effective best
practices, and (4) rectifying targeted areas of staff incompetence.  But
this theory, as fleshed out in Part III, generally reserves to the profes-
sional discretion of school-level educators all other matters concerning
the methods employed to fulfill these objectives.
Part III concludes by urging policymakers, even if they reject this
approach or parts of it, to adopt an alternate approach to education law
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and mandates that affirmatively acknowledges the discretion-stripping
implications of proposed mandates and that seeks either to justify lost
discretion by specifically identifying superseding benefits of uniformity
or to minimize the costs of lost discretion by crafting each mandate’s
scope carefully.
I. THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF UNIFORMITY
IN CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Contemporary public schools are highly uniform, bureaucratic, and
rule-bound.  The heavily standardized character of American public
schools is rooted both in history and in the mandate-making tendencies
of the modern regulatory state.  This uniformity spans not only poli-
cymaking, operational, and personnel functions, but also core elements
of teaching and learning.
This institutional design derives from Common School and progres-
sive era antecedents in which public schools’ primary purpose was to
assimilate children, particularly immigrants, into American culture.22  To
the extent skills were taught, they were low-level, repetitive ones, which
were all that contemporaneous labor markets required.23  The learning of
higher-order skills was a luxury reserved for a privileged minority.24  In-
dustrial-age reforms in the early part of the twentieth century assumed
these purposes for public schools, but introduced progressive-era ideas
around organizational efficiency, applying to schools the same assembly-
line operational practices that worked effectively in other areas of the
industrial economy.25  These core structural characteristics form the op-
erational foundation for today’s public schools.
Yet, in the last generation or so, the nation has realized with increas-
ing urgency that the outcomes of its public schools are misaligned with
the country’s competitive needs, and this realization has spurred govern-
ment to responsive action.  These responses, however, have fundamen-
tally left untouched the mandate-based uniformity built into the
foundations of American public education.  The modern era of education
policymaking is defined, primarily, by two economic imperatives that
have upended traditional thoughts about schools: globalization and tech-
22 See Joseph P. Viteritti, The Inadequacy of Adequacy Guarantees: A Historical Com-
mentary on State Constitutional Provisions That Are the Basis for School Finance Litigation, 7
U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 58, 73 (2007) (“Mann, more than anything
else, sought to make Americans of the foreign masses that had come to the city, but his notion
of what it meant to be an American was a narrow one.”); see also HESS, supra note 16, at R
85–87 (discussing how nineteenth century schools inculcated “American” values).
23 See Viteritti, supra note 22, at 73.
24 HESS, supra note 16, at 22; see also DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 2. R
25 See infra Part I.A; see, e.g., DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 148–66 (1974).
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nological change, each of which has accelerated the need for better edu-
cated citizens.  International competition and technological
advancements have produced a global economy where growth depends
increasingly on the ability of individuals and teams to reason, think, and
innovate—skills inextricably tied to the quality and quantity of
education.
This growing awareness of the need for better educated people has
motivated policymakers to seek to improve the quality of public school
outcomes in the last few decades.  Mid-to-late twentieth century policy
debates around educational effectiveness were devoted substantially to
issues of racial integration and equity.  The racial-equity struggle was
then succeeded by a wave of fiscal-equity litigation and policymaking.
That wave birthed policymaking and litigation challenging the adequacy
of educational programs, curricula, and instruction, given the chronically
poor results of prior reform efforts.  Finally, the current standards-and-
assessment regime has focused on requiring schools to ensure all chil-
dren—regardless of race, gender, or educational disability—meet
achievement benchmarks as measured by performance on standardized
tests.
But, as discussed below, each of these waves of educational poli-
cymaking has largely assumed, rather than interrogated, public schools’
core structural elements.  The racial-equity and school-finance waves
largely ignored questions about the operational character of schools, fo-
cusing instead on the distribution of students and resources in racially
equitable ways.  The educational-adequacy and standards-and-assess-
ment waves also take for granted current structural arrangements.  In
fact, policymaking premised on standards and assessment reinforces uni-
formity by imposing additional mandates on top of prior ones, often rely-
ing on consultant-based curricular and instructional models that prescribe
teaching practice in standardized ways.
Education policymaking by rule is also amplified, in the modern
era, by the mandate-making impulses of the contemporary regulatory
state.  The political need for policymakers to demonstrate responsiveness
to intense public priorities—coupled with the number of federal, state,
and local actors with the power to impose mandates on schools—fuels
additional rulemaking.  These mandates, moreover, rarely supplant pre-
existing ones but usually supplement them, further preempting school-
based discretion and often sowing confusion for local educators seeking
to reconcile unclear and sometimes conflicting duties.  And districts and
schools disproportionately serving stigmatized minority groups are espe-
cially susceptible to government by rule, given the interplay of these dy-
namics and racial stigma, among other things.
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This Part will expound upon these points by first describing the his-
torical roots of standardized schools, and then the modern factors that
exacerbate these historic conditions.
A. The Historical Roots of Standardized Schools
The core structural elements of contemporary public schools are
anchored in common school and industrial-age beliefs about the ways in
which public schools ought to be structured.  Common schools were de-
signed primarily to assimilate the growing number of nineteenth and
twentieth century immigrants into American society and values.  In the
mid-nineteenth century, immigration to the United States had skyrock-
eted.  A nation of 13 million people in 1830 saw 19 million new immi-
grants enter the country between 1830 and 1900.26  Motivated primarily
by concerns that the country would disintegrate culturally, school re-
formers proposed free, public common schools as a means of assimilat-
ing these new arrivals.27  This assimilationist motivation was so strong
that common schoolers pursued laws barring private school attendance to
preclude immigrant parents from circumventing school-based
Americanization.28
Although skill development and poverty mitigation were relevant
factors for common schoolers, these considerations were decidedly sec-
ondary to cultural assimilation.29  And to the limited degree that common
schools sought to develop academic skills, a basic set of skills was all
that was intended as contemporary labor markets did not require more,
and, philosophically, common schoolers neither intended nor expected
that higher-level training was sensible for the masses of American chil-
dren.30  High school graduation was uncommon, and college attendance
even rarer—and neither was expected for the broad range of students.
The strong impulse to Americanize immigrants around core Ameri-
can cultural values led to a corresponding uniformity in structure and
method.  The curriculum of common schools was standardized and,
given the strong cultural imperatives motivating their operation, policy-
makers mandated Bible reading and related courses on Christianity.  Stu-
26 HESS, supra note 16, at 86. R
27 See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 22, at 73; Kevin G. Welner, Locking Up the Market- R
place of Ideas and Locking Up School Reform: Courts’ Imprudent Treatment of Controversial
Teaching in America’s Public Schools, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 959, 976–77 (2003) (finding that
common schoolers “stressed the importance of education in controlling and restraining the
populace so that they would not threaten social harmony”).
28 See, e.g., Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival
of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 413, 416–18 (2003).
29 See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 22, at 73. R
30 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 2; HESS, supra note 16, at 22. R
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dents were sorted and assigned to teachers in rigid ways that disallowed
variance.  Policymakers required students to be transitioned from one
teacher to the next at pre-determined intervals, also without permitting
individualized deviation based on local needs.31
The standardization of public schools was reinforced during the in-
dustrial age of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Indus-
trial-age progressives applied to public schools the same factory-model
conceptions of organizational design used in the manufacturing sector.
To industrial-age progressives, flexibility and discretion were anathema:
progressives sought to minimize human variance as an input in organiza-
tional design, and thus autonomy itself was thought inconsistent with the
goal of maximizing productive efficiency.32  The following description
of early twentieth century perspectives on school design is illustrative:
Our schools may be looked upon as a great system of
education in which the children are both the raw material
and the workers . . . .  The problem in the school, as in
any other factory, is to secure the largest output with the
least waste of material and labor.33
Schools were factories, designed to produce reliably uniform out-
puts cheaply and efficiently.  Progressives, consequently, sought to sys-
temize the range of school operations in uniform, assembly-line ways
that intentionally sought to minimize discretion in favor of top-down
mandates.  Progressives not only prescribed curricular objectives, but
also instructional methods through mandated textbooks and assessments,
which in turn were linked to class time and day, so that specified portions
of textbooks were to be covered at prescribed times.34
Progressives also imposed discretion-stripping rules on time.  Not
only was the total amount of minutes in the school day and the number of
days in the school year regulated, but also the way in which the school
day itself was structured, as school days were divided into time-limited
31 HESS, supra note 16, at 82–88. R
32 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that the school system in the R
early 1900s “was based on the factory model then made popular by Henry Ford’s assembly
line” and that “[t]his transmission-oriented curriculum was designed to be delivered in large,
impersonal factory-model schools”); HESS, supra note 16, at 211 (noting that Progressives R
“rejected flexibility in the name of efficiency and uniformity,” and that “[t]heir legacy of
rigidity and uniformity suffuses management, staffing, compensation, and the educational en-
terprise down to this day”). See generally DAVID B. TYACK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GREAT
AMERICAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS: HOW BIG CITIES ARE RESHAPING PUBLIC EDUCATION (William
Lowe Boyd et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter THE TRANSFORMATION OF GREAT AMERICAN
SCHOOL DISTRICTS].
33 HESS, supra note 16, at 105 (citing GEORGE HERBERT BETTS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES OF R
EDUCATION 86 (1912)).
34 See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 2, at 184–85; Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? R
Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 145–48 (2000).
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blocks in which all students were exposed to the same material each day.
Progressives further cemented assembly-line approaches to student
growth initiated during the common-school era, requiring the promotion
of children to the next grade after exposure to a teacher and textbook for
a specified amount of time, and structuring promotion so that in advanc-
ing through grades, students were passed from one teacher to the next,
with the process renewing itself at the next grade level.35
Progressives organized personnel management similarly to elimi-
nate school and classroom-level autonomy.  Progressives created top-
down bureaucracies to ensure school leaders and classroom teachers uni-
formly implemented prescribed policies and practices.  These bureaucra-
cies focused on inputs—number of students taught, amount of time
taught, school-level fidelity to textbook-prescribed practice and assess-
ment—and so school-level practitioners, the line-level workers in this
factory model, oriented their priorities too around the activities pre-
scribed by rule and for which supervisors would seek proof of
compliance.36
Because these practices specifically sought to eliminate school- and
classroom-level autonomy, school leadership and teaching were fungible,
assembly-line functions for which professional skill was immaterial.37
Progressives designed teaching to be routine and teachers to be indistin-
guishable.38  The following description is illustrative:
Teaching work was designed to be routine, with little
need for professional skill and judgment, and no built-in
structures for developing these abilities.  Instead of in-
vesting directly in teachers’ knowledge, a bureaucracy
was constructed to prescribe, manage, and control the
work of teachers . . . .39
B. Uniformity in the Modern Era: The Mandate-Making Impulses of
the Modern Regulatory State
1. The Mid-Century Focus on Racial Equity Ignores
Standardized Schools
The common-school and progressive eras produced mid-twentieth-
century public schools that were highly uniform in structure and opera-
tions, and that also were designed to pursue assimilationist objectives
35 O’Brien, supra note 34, at 146–48.
36 LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE RIGHT TO LEARN: A BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING
SCHOOLS THAT WORK 7 (2001) (“Large impersonal factory-model schools with rigid tracking
systems were created to teach rudimentary skills and unwavering compliance . . . .”).
37 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 237. R
38 Id.
39 Id.
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and to teach children a basic set of skills relevant to existing industrial
labor markets.  This structure came under mid-century stress not because
policymakers sought to revisit its uniformity or low-skill orientation but
instead because of concerns that students and resources were distributed
to individual districts and schools in racially discriminatory ways.  The
fight for racially integrated student-assignment policies would yield, later
in the twentieth century, to a push for equitable school funding, and then,
later, to a thrust for standards-and-assessment reform.  But these modern
reforms fundamentally assume the structural elements inherited from the
Common School and Progressive Eras, and in fact largely seek to impose
additional prescriptions on top of these, rather than reevaluating the
ongoing effectiveness of these traditional mandates in light of modern
goals.
For much of the twentieth century, national policymaking concern-
ing public schools focused principally on racial and ethnic equity.  A
series of legal challenges, culminating in the landmark Brown v. Board
of Education decision,40 required student and resource integration in pub-
lic schools across racial lines.41  For much of the next twenty years, law-
yers, judges, and policymakers struggled to implement Brown in the face
of both outright defiance and indirect circumvention.42 Milliken v. Brad-
ley then sounded Brown’s death-knell by prohibiting desegregation reme-
dies that reached beyond the boundaries of a school district or
municipality.43  This decision rendered Brown unresponsive to accelerat-
ing white flight from cities in the 1970s.44 Milliken became the legal
explanation for the isolated and overwhelmingly minority inner-city
school systems that persist to this day, as it placed patterns of residential
segregation beyond Brown’s purview.45
40 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41 See id. at 493; see, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
18–20 (1971) (affirming judicial power to issue extraordinary remedies to facilitate desegrega-
tion); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasizing need for immediate
remedies to address desegregation); see also Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advanc-
ing Brown’s Goal of Educational Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175,
181–83 (2005).
42 See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 3.7.4 (6th ed.
2008); see also Griffin v. Cnty, Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221–23 (1964) (describing shutting
down of all schools in a county to avoid desegregation).
43 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
44 Milliken would be the beginning of the end for Brown-style integrationist remedies, as
the Supreme Court held that desegregation mandates stopped at a school district’s borders. Id.
This decision foreclosed so-called metropolitan desegregation remedies, in which courts would
include adjacent majority-white suburban school districts in decrees designed to remedy one-
race schools in neighboring districts. Id.
45 Public schools today are highly segregated—by some indicators, even more so than
during the desegregation era. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PRO-
JECT AT HARVARD UNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE
LOSING THE DREAM? 31 (2003), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
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As racially integrated schools became less plausible after Milliken,
advocates brought lawsuits demanding that states increase funding or
dramatically enhance program offerings in majority-minority schools.46
Where successful, these actions either required states to pump additional
funds into poorly funded, racially isolated school districts47 or to provide
additional services or resources—from upgraded facilities to universal
pre-school to magnet schools to curricular transformations—designed to
improve the quality of educational services delivered by demographically
isolated districts.48
Ultimately, the Post-Progressive Era school litigation battles were
about the distribution of resources within a structural framework essen-
tially unchanged from the uniform factories bequeathed by the Common
School and Progressive Eras.  The generations of litigation and poli-
cymaking involving racial integration ignored questions of organiza-
tional design, uniformity, and educator autonomy, focusing instead on
the racial distribution of students in schools.  Likewise, school funding
and program adequacy efforts bypassed these questions by focusing on
instructional programs that operated within the standardized confines of
traditional mandates.
2. Late Twentieth Century Efforts Focusing on Standards and
Accountability
Although litigation-based education advocacy drove national school
policymaking for the majority of the twentieth century, the latter part of
the century saw a flurry of legislative action as leaders became increas-
ingly aware of the misalignment between the preparedness of America’s
public school graduates and the demands of the modern economy.  This
lawmaking effort, originally prompted by the equity-based imperatives
underlying the earlier lawsuits, was spurred by the increasing urgency
education/integration-and-diversity/a-multiracial-society-with-segregated-schools-are-we-los
ing-the-dream (showing that the percentage of white students in the school of an average black
student was lower in 2000 than it was in the early 1970s); Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and
Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2003) (“Schools
are more segregated today than they have been for decades, and segregation is rapidly increas-
ing.”); Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated Housing Patterns and the Fail-
ure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 55–56 (2002) (finding that “the
nation’s inner cities are more segregated today than they were 50 years ago”).
46 See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 266–68 (1999).
47 See id.
48 See generally Paul A. Minorini & Stephen A. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and
the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADE-
QUACY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175, 188–89 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds.,
1999); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”:
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (1995).
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brought to bear by the civil rights movement.49  Successful legal and
political advocacy triggered related remedial legislative action in the
form of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which were then fol-
lowed by laws extending protection to students with disabilities in the
form of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Individuals
with Disabilities in Education Act in 1975.50  These laws sought to fulfill
both Brown’s commitment to non-discrimination—extending beyond
race to include other prejudices, including gender and disability—and the
civil rights movement’s commitment to class-based equity, as reflected
in Title I’s provisions granting additional federal funds to educate poor
children.  Most pertinent here, like the litigation and social-justice goals
motivating these legislative actions, these measures either ignored or
simply assumed the structurally uniform character and operation of
America’s public schools.
As lawyers, post-Milliken, began looking at lawsuits premised on
the inadequacy of student outcomes, so too did policymakers increas-
ingly move from a focus on racial equity and toward a focus on im-
proved student achievement.  In 1981, concerned with high dropout rates
and low levels of achievement by American students on international
tests, the United States Department of Education asked a blue-ribbon
panel of educators, called the National Commission on Excellence in Ed-
ucation, to examine the quality of American public education and to re-
port to Congress and to the president on the panel’s findings and
recommendations.51  The subsequent report, entitled A Nation at Risk,
called “one of the most important federal education efforts in American
history,”52 found that America’s public schools were underperforming
dramatically, so much so that they were endangering the country’s eco-
nomic viability and its competitive future.  The panel’s findings were
stark:
“If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose
on America the mediocre educational performance that
49 See Jack M. Balkin, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1548–49 (2004) (describing how the civil
rights movement’s advocacy for equality and educational opportunity spurred responsive legis-
lative action).
50 See id.; see also Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and
Legislative Opportunities, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 233–234 (2011).
51 See DAVID P. GARDNER ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION
AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM iii (1983), available at http://eric.ed
.gov/?id=ED226006.
52 SUSAN FUHRMAN & MARVIN LAZERSON, Introduction to THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, at xxvi
(Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., 2005).
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exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of
war.”53
A Nation at Risk crystallized public concern with the state of Ameri-
can public schools, and prompted a flurry of federal and state action de-
signed to respond to the grave, even existential, concerns outlined by the
report’s authors.54  In particular, states increased graduation standards,
teacher-certification requirements, student assessment and testing, and
specified particular kinds of courses—particularly in mathematics and
science—required for graduation.55  These efforts generally focused on
substantially increasing the state-specified standards students needed to
satisfy to obtain a high-school diploma, and increasing testing and as-
sessment to determine, at regular intervals, whether students were on
track to achieve those standards.
The federal government followed suit.  In 1994, Congress enacted
the Improving America’s Schools Act, which required schools to raise
standards for all students, regardless of income, race, or other indicators
of risk.56  Congress doubled down on standards and accountability with
the 2002 enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”), which
requires states to ensure that all children, including racial minorities, stu-
dents with disabilities, and English Language Learners, meet state-deter-
mined proficiency benchmarks.  NCLB requires states to test students
broadly, and these scores, including the test scores of discrete student
subgroups, determine whether a district is satisfactorily addressing stu-
dent needs.57
In 2009, the United States Department of Education announced its
Race to the Top program, which conditions receipt of federal grant fund-
ing on whether a state increases graduation standards to enable graduates
to compete globally; invests in teacher training, retention, and perform-
ance-based accountability; and engages in aggressive efforts, including
restructuring, charter-school conversion, and closure, for persistently
failing schools.58
53 GARDNER, supra note 51.
54 See FUHRMAN & LAZERSON, supra note 52, at xxvii (describing various federal and
state education-reform initiatives triggered by A Nation at Risk).
55 Id. at xxvii–xxviii.
56 See Kenneth K. Wong, Federal Educational Policy as an Anti-Poverty Strategy, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 421, 435–37 (2002); see also Benjamin Michael
Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the
Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 134 n.9 (2011).
57 See, e.g., Craig Livermore & Michael Lewchuck, Centralized Standards and Decen-
tralized Competition: Suggested Revisions for No Child Left Behind to Create Greater Educa-
tional Responsiveness Toward Disempowered Minority Groups, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433,
457–59 (2009).
58 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
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Yet, similar to prior reforms involving racial integration, school
funding, and programmatic adequacy, the legislative changes of the last
twenty years also sidestepped structural questions of uniformity and dis-
cretion-stripping.  On the contrary, standards and accountability has, in
many ways, produced greater uniformity in operations and practice by
detailing the curricular standards public school bureaucracies must fulfill
and then requiring frequent standardized testing to determine whether
students are mastering the content specified by those standards.  In addi-
tion, as lawmakers have increasingly specified curricular standards and
related assessment tools, government has likewise increasingly required
the use of paint-by-numbers instructional materials aligned with these
standards and assessments—many of which circumscribe teachers’ in-
structional practice in precise detail.59
The standards-and-accountability push, codified most prominently
by NCLB but also present in states’ increasing adoption of baseline cur-
ricular standards, thus leaves untouched the fundamentals of traditional
public school structure and operations.  Even more, standards and ac-
countability grafts onto traditional structures additional uniform obliga-
tions that affect student outcomes as well as the means used by schools
to reach those outcomes.  And Race to the Top’s tangential efforts at
structural reform, as discussed further below, represent a narrow and ten-
tative exception that proves the rule.60
C. Uniform Rulemaking Is Inherent to the Modern Regulatory State
and Has Exacerbated the Structural Inflexibility Established in
the Common School and Progressive Eras
I wrote a prior article that discusses the ways that compliance
through mandates is inherent to the modern regulatory state.61  And by
regulatory state here, I am not referring only to what is traditionally
meant—namely, the administrative state—but also the full range of ways
that policymakers impose legally enforceable duties on schools.62
As I have written before, mandates are a central feature of modern
policymaking.  First, they represent publicly discernible evidence of a
policymaker’s attempts to vindicate substantial public concerns.63  Few
policy priorities today are of greater voter concern than the quality of
public education.  Mandates represent tangible evidence that political au-
thorities can point to as responsive to those concerns.
59 See infra Part II.
60 See infra Part I.E.
61 Shavar D. Jeffries, The Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized Mi-
norities: The Need for Institutional Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 46–59 (2006).
62 Id.
63 See id. at 47–48, 51–52.
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Second, mandates provide policymakers with the power to perpetu-
ate their own priorities across future administrations.  New legal dic-
tates—particularly statutory ones, which are harder to change than
administrative rules—provide policymakers with the opportunity to force
future actors to comply with their policies.64
Third, mandates, self-evidently, enable standardized compliance
with a policymaker’s priorities.  The uniformity prescribed by a mandate
is, often, precisely the point: policymakers seek to compel those actors
subject to the mandate to comply with its terms uniformly.  Local discre-
tion empowers other actors to pursue practices that might not align with a
policymaker’s preferred course, and so mandates protect policymakers
against local deviation from their priorities.65
These impulses toward mandates are amplified by the number of
authorities with the power to impose legally enforceable obligations on
schools.  Federal, state, county, and municipal legislative bodies may im-
pose mandates on schools.  Parallel administrative authorities at each of
these levels also have mandate-making power, including the school dis-
trict itself.  Moreover, the school district’s interactions with its labor
force, in many states and districts, are codified in collective-bargaining
agreements that generally sweep well beyond the nuts and bolts of sala-
ries and benefits and impose mandates on a range of matters affecting the
classroom.66
Courts, also, are a growing source of uniformity.  The proliferation
of mandates generates associated legal rights that, in turn, fuel private
lawsuits seeking compliance with a mandate’s terms.  Courts, then, issue
remedial orders that require districts to take prescribed steps and thus
further limit school-based discretion.  Although court orders traditionally
focused on student assignment or resource distribution, as education law
and associated mandates transitioned to programmatic and curricular
matters, courts too have correspondingly issued orders more frequently
that specify the kinds of programs and even instructional methods that
ought to be used in individual schools to facilitate student achievement.67
Finally, districts disproportionately serving stigmatized racial mi-
norities are especially subject to external rulemaking because of linger-
ing doubts about the capacity of minority leadership to effectively govern
schools and districts.  Also, for various historic and current reasons, ma-
jority-minority districts disproportionately underperform and, thus,
uniquely create conditions susceptible to mandates.  Racial stigma con-
veys that minorities are less competent than others, and those perceptions
64 See id. at 48–50.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 36–45.
67 See id. at 45–46.
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impel policymakers to impose mandates as a substitute for local discre-
tion.  Likewise, because racially isolated, inner-city school districts per-
form demonstrably worse than the average American public school, these
schools uniquely present conditions that are conducive to mandates, as
policymakers seek to demonstrate to stakeholders responsive action to
important public concerns about underperforming schools.68
D. What These Traditional and Structural Practices Yield Today in
Application: The Examples of School Structure, Personnel, and
Teaching and Learning
The historic practices discussed in the previous sections, coupled
with the structural impulses toward mandates intrinsic to the modern reg-
ulatory state, yield a set of education mandates that affect broad aspects
of school operations and student learning.69  Yet to paint a more specific
picture of the regulatory context faced by school-level educators, I will
highlight here three particular areas—school structure, personnel, and
teaching and learning—that vividly reveal the degree to which rules pre-
empt school-based professional discussion to address particular student
needs.
Mandates require school operations to be structured in uniform
ways.  Rules governing instructional time, including the distribution and
availability of time during the school day and year, constrain school-
level flexibility to format instructional time in response to the particular
needs of the local student population.70  Among other things, these man-
dates governing time inhibit the flexible use of extended-learning-time
68 See id. at 46–54.
69 See PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL 176, 223–24 (2000); JEFFREY C. HENIG ET AL., THE COLOR OF
SCHOOL REFORM: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN EDUCATION 28–29, 274
(1999); WILBUR C. RICH, BLACK MAYORS AND SCHOOL POLITICS: THE FAILURE OF REFORM IN
DETROIT, GARY, AND NEWARK 9, 13, 203–08 (1996); see also JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M.
MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 58–59 (1990) (“[T]he public world of
educational practice is a world of rules imposed on the schools by local, state, and federal
authorities.”); FREDERICK M. HESS, COMMON SENSE SCHOOL REFORM 6 (2004) (“Rules, proce-
dures, and collective bargaining agreements have rendered public school systems heavy-footed
and sluggish.”); Law and Public Education: The Paralyzing Effects of Excessive Bureaucracy,
COMMON GOOD (Aug. 1, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/20041026101924/http://cgood.org/
schools-reading-cgpubs-factsheets-7.html (“The morass of legal bureaucracy in America’s
public schools is undermining the ability of teachers and school administrators to use their best
judgment to create effective learning environments.  The nearly endless bureaucratic rules
crush teachers’ spirits, and legal rules prevent school administrators from effectively operating
their schools.”) (accessed by searching for http://cgood.org/schools-reading-cgpubs-factsheets-
7.html in the Internet Archive index).
70 See, e.g., Thomas Corcoran & Margaret Goertz, The Governance of Public Education,
in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 52, at 37; see also Liebman & Sabel, supra note 2, at R
221–22 (discussing opportunities for increasing proficiency for individual student populations
with increased learning time).
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strategies, either for all students or for certain discrete student popula-
tions.  In addition, rules requiring grade-level promotion after a student
has sat in class for the required number of days and hours, even if the
student fails to obtain the knowledge expected for that school year, un-
dermines school-level educators’ ability to more flexibly use instruc-
tional time to meet individualized needs.71
The regulation of personnel decisions is particularly restricting.
Mandates rooted in state and local law, as well as collectively bargained
contracts, significantly constrain school-level discretion in hiring, evalu-
ation, pay, retention, promotion, assignment, and termination—the fun-
damentals of performance-based management for any large organization.
Teacher hiring is limited generally to those individuals who are “certi-
fied” and thus legally eligible to be hired by school districts.72  This
seems reasonable on its face but is less so given substantial evidence
showing most states’ certification practices have little correlation to
teacher effectiveness.73
Teacher and principal evaluation, moreover, are too often bureau-
cratic exercises in rule compliance, instead of professional, thoughtful
assessments of educational practice.74  Educator evaluation is heavily
71 See generally Elizabeth M. King et al., Promotion with and Without Learning: Effects
on Student Enrollment and Dropout Behavior (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 4722, 1999), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ZPKGF1YLH0.
72 Donald Boyd et al., The Effect of Certification and Preparation on Teacher Quality,
FUTURE CHILD., Spring 2007, at 45, 45–68, available at http://futureofchildren.org/publica-
tions/journals/article/index.xml?journalid=34&articleid=75 (discussing the effectiveness of re-
quiring teacher certification).
73 See Chaim Karczag, Undermining Teacher Quality: The Perverse Consequences of
Certification, in EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA: Brown v. Board after Half a
Century, 109, 110–13 (David Salisbury & Casey Lartigue, Jr. eds., 2004).  State laws, moreo-
ver, dictate the substantive content of certification, requiring candidates to attend pre-approved
post-baccalaureate programs, and take pre-determined courses. See id.  Certification, however,
is weakly linked to student achievement. See, e.g., JAY P. GREENE ET AL., EDUCATION MYTHS:
WHAT SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WANT YOU TO BELIEVE ABOUT OUR SCHOOLS—AND WHY
IT ISN’T SO 61-70 (2005); Karczag, supra, at 119 (“[T]here is little evidence linking teacher
certification to student achievement.”).  Even worse, growing evidence suggests certification
lowers teacher quality by deterring talented candidates. See Howard Fuller & George A.
Mitchell, A Culture of Complaint, EDUCATION NEXT, Summer 2006, at 18, 21 (“Inflexible
staffing rules . . . ‘undermine the ability of urban schools to hire and keep the best possible
teachers.’”); Richard W. Riley, U.S. Sec’y  of Educ., New Challenges, a New Resolve: Mov-
ing American Education into the 21st Century (Feb. 16, 1999), available at http://heart-
land.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/2757.pdf (“Too many
potential teachers are turned away because of the cumbersome process that requires them to
jump through hoops and lots of them.”). But see Mary E. Diez, In Defense of Regulation, in
CHOICE AND COMPETITION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 43, 43–45 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2006)
(noting that teacher certification “has served its basic purpose” in ensuring, teacher compe-
tency and that a well-designed program could improve teacher quality).
74 See, e.g., WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (“Evaluations are short and infrequent R
. . . conducted by administrators without extensive training, and influenced by powerful cul-
tural forces.”).
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constrained by mandates, arising both out of state law and collective-
bargaining agreements.75  These mandates, among other things, restrict
evaluation criteria in ways that preempt assessments of educators’ effec-
tiveness in meeting the individualized needs of students, often prohibit-
ing consideration of student achievement or other evidence of an
educator’s actual performance in delivering services to individual stu-
dents.76  Mandates also specify the staff authorized to conduct or other-
wise participate in evaluations; the evidence that may support
evaluations; and the timing, duration, and frequency of school and class-
room visits for evaluation purposes.
Teacher assignment to classrooms is also characterized by lockstep
mandates that broadly constrain discretion.  Teachers are often assigned
to classrooms based on rules that prioritize a teacher’s years of experi-
ence instead of the individual needs of classrooms or discrete student
populations.77  Class-size mandates that ignore local context amplify
these constraints.  Rigid class-size rules undercut school-level discretion
to flexibly assign teachers based on the relationship of an individual
teacher’s particular strengths to the specific needs of student groups.
Such rules preclude principals, for example, from assigning a more ex-
perienced or better performing teacher to a larger class while assigning
less proficient teachers to smaller classes or other classes a weaker
teacher might handle competently.  Class-size mandates also require
more teachers to be spread over more classes, exacerbating existing
shortages for schools in hiring and retaining high-performing teachers.78
Moreover, in the absence of a corresponding change in labor markets that
proportionately increase the number of high-performing teachers, class-
size mandates assume fungibility in teaching and, thus, ignore the
school- and classroom-level costs to student achievement of its across-
the-board mandate.
Compensation practices are comparably rule-bound.  Educators gen-
erally are paid lockstep based on years of experience or the possession of
specified credentials, with mandates precluding school-based staff from
considering additional factors.  Such precluded factors include whether
the educator is effective in meeting student needs, whether the educator
75 Id.
76 See id. at 10.
77 See id.
78 See, e.g., HESS, supra note 16, at 85; GREENE ET AL., supra note 73, at 50–51 (discuss- R
ing attempts in Florida and New York to reduce class sizes statewide); Class Size, EDUCATION
WEEK (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.edweek.org/rc/issues/class-size/?levelId=1000; see also
Matthew Chingos, The Impact of a Universal Class-Size Reduction Policy: Evidence from
Florida’s Statewide Mandate (Program on Educ. Policy & Governance Harvard Kennedy Sch.,
Working Paper No. 10–03, 2010), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/
PEPG10-03_Chingos.pdf.
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serves in a hard-to-fill position, or whether the position is extraordinarily
important in light of local student needs (for example, a literacy coach or
teacher for a school with a disproportionate number of students strug-
gling with reading).79
Similarly, tenure rules preempt retention and termination decisions.
Rigid tenure rules in practice amount to a lifetime guarantee of employ-
ment, regardless of district- or school-based perspectives about a princi-
pal’s or teacher’s effectiveness in meeting student needs.80  Just the
same, mandates remove performance-based discretion in layoffs, gener-
ally requiring layoff decisions to be based only or primarily on years of
experience, regardless of whether more individualized decisions might
better serve student needs.81
These personnel mandates create a managerial environment where
rule-based uniformity broadly precludes case-by-case decisions that per-
mit districts and schools to hire, assign, pay, retain, fire, or lay off educa-
tors in ways that reflect the actual needs of affected students.  These rules
create the so-called Widget Effect, a school environment where individ-
ual educators are so fungible that individualized professional practice is
superseded by rule-based governance in which the mandate essentially
supplies decisions.82  This organizational context of heavily standardized
and rule-bound personnel management legislates away the managerial
tools necessary to ensure that school-based staff identify and address the
needs of individual students.  Given the consistent research showing that
effective teachers are the most important in-school factor contributing to
student achievement, such straitjacketed personnel mandates are particu-
larly impactful on student educational outcomes.83
Teaching and learning—the core instructional interaction between
teacher and student—is also heavily regulated.  Rules governing instruc-
tional materials, pedagogy, and testing limit school and classroom level
flexibility in core areas.  These rules prescribe the particular textbooks,
79 See WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 29. R
80 See id. at 2 (“[T]eacher tenure and due process protections render dismissal a practical
impossibility, shielding ineffective teachers from removal in all but the most egregious in-
stances.”); see also DINAH FREY, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, STATE TEACHER TENURE/
CONTINUING CONTRACT LAWS (2010), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/88/28/
8828.pdf.
81 See, e.g., CARRIE HAHNEL ET AL., THE EDUC. TRUST—WEST, VICTIMS OF THE CHURN:
THE DAMAGING IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S TEACHER LAYOFF POLICIES ON SCHOOLS, STUDENTS,
AND COMMUNITIES IN THREE LARGE DISTRICTS (2011), available at http://www.edtrust.org/
sites/edtrust.org/files/ETW%20Victims%20of%20the%20Churn%20Report.pdf; THE NEW
TEACHER PROJECT, A SMARTER TEACHER LAYOFF SYSTEM 1–2 (2010), available at http://
tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Smarter_Teacher_Layoffs_Mar10.pdf.
82 See generally WEISBERG ET AL., supra note 6. R
83 See, e.g., CHARLES M. PAYNE, SO MUCH REFORM, SO LITTLE CHANGE: THE PERSIS-
TENCE OF FAILURE IN URBAN SCHOOLS 72 (2008).
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materials, and teaching methods available to principals and teachers.84
These rules may prevent school-level staff from selecting textbooks and
instructional materials that might best serve the particular needs of the
students they serve or from flexibly using different materials for different
students, or from using different materials at different times, as appropri-
ate for a particular student’s needs at a particular time.  So, for example,
if a particular student is struggling with a particular mathematics task,
educators are too often confined to the pre-determined regulatory script
in terms of how to address that student’s needs.
The increasing focus on testing and accountability, moreover, has
fueled a consultant-driven industry in which vendors have developed
programs that tightly integrate daily school and classroom practice with
standardized curricula and testing.  Consultant-driven models, like Suc-
cess for All, among others, provide out-of-the-box directives that specify,
often on a minute-by-minute basis, precisely how teachers ought to in-
struct students, use classroom time, and employ instructional materials.85
The heavily regulated character of teaching and learning has “teacher
proofed” education in important ways, subordinating flexible instruc-
tional exchanges between teacher and student to these uniform
mandates.86
In these ways, school structure, personnel management, and even
the nuts and bolts of teaching and learning illustrate the extent to which
mandates constrain school-based discretion to deliver educational ser-
vices directly responsive to the actual and evolving needs of students.
The problem is not necessarily with any particular rule—although, to be
84 See DAVID T. CONLEY, WHO GOVERNS OUR SCHOOLS: CHANGING ROLES AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES 1 (2003); Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 70, at 37; DATNOW ET AL., supra note R
10, at 20; RAPP, supra note 10, at ch. 7–R1, tbl.17; Herbert J. Walberg, Real Accountability, in R
OUR SCHOOLS & OUR FUTURE: ARE WE STILL AT RISK? 305, 309 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003)
(discussing state regulation of public school curriculum); ELAINE M. WALKER, EDUCATIONAL
ADEQUACY AND THE COURTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 131, 155–56 (2005).
85 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. OUCHI, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: A REVOLUTIONARY PLAN TO
GET YOUR CHILDREN THE EDUCATION THEY NEED 76–78 (2003) (describing the lockstep ap-
proach of Open Court, a structured reading program adopted by the states of California &
Texas, as well as numerous districts and schools around the country); The Reading Edge Mid-
dle Grades, SUCCESS FOR ALL FOUNDATION, http://www.successforall.org/Middle-High/Power
ful-Instruction/The-Reading-Edge-Middle-School/, (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) (describing the
Reading Edge program, created by the Success for All Foundation, which provides teachers
with detailed lesson plans, necessary student materials, assessment tools, instructional strate-
gies, and goal-setting assistance); see also Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, app. II at 529–31
(N.J. 1998) (endorsing New Jersey’s adoption of the Success for All program for urban dis-
tricts); Martin Haberman, Urban Education: The State of Urban Schooling at the Start of the
21st Century, EDUCATION NEWS, (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.educationnews.org/articles/ur
ban-education-the-state-of-urban-schooling-at-the-start-of-the-21st-century.html.
86 See, e.g., Beatty, supra note 11; Linda Darling-Hammond, Changing Conceptions of R
Teaching and Teacher Development, TCHR. EDUC. Q., Fall 1995, at 9, 10, available at http://
www.teqjournal.org/backvols/1995/22_4/F95_darling%20hammond.pdf.
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sure, many them are counter-productive by themselves—but with the
sheer weight of the mandates and the degree to which they are unreflec-
tive of a purposeful consideration of their benefits and costs.  Policymak-
ers rarely balance the discretion-stripping consequences of education
mandates, instead imposing uniformity when in fact more individualized
practices would often better serve the objectives a mandate purports to
serve.
E. Tentative Efforts at Structural Reform—Primarily Through
Charters, Portfolio Approaches to Governance, and Vouchers—
Are Rare Exceptions Proving the Rule of Command-and-
Control Governance and Also Largely Re-Create the
Uniform Operational Structure Characterizing
Traditional Governance
The above shows the highly uniform character of public schools,
both generally and in the specific context of school structure, operations,
and teaching and learning.  Some might suggest that recent education
innovations—primarily pubic charter schools, portfolio approaches to
governance, and school vouchers—show that law and education govern-
ance is moving away from the uniformity described above.87  But, in
fact, these exceptions both reinforce and prove the rule.
States, to varying degrees, have experimented with public charter
schools as a means to provide alternate and more flexible governance
and operational templates for public schools.88  The federal government,
too, has nudged states toward a tentative engagement with charter
schools by specifying, under NCLB, the conversion of a district school to
a charter school if the school fails persistently and, under Race to the
Top, more specifically earmarking the receipt of federal grant funds to
more flexible practices concerning charter-school growth.
87 See, e.g., THE TRANSFORMATION OF GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS, supra note
32 (arguing that more recent efforts to grant parents more choice imply an imminent transition R
to radically restructured schools).
88 See LOIS HOLZMAN, SCHOOLS FOR GROWTH: RADICAL ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT
EDUCATIONAL MODELS 81 (1997); PAUL THOMAS HILL ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND AC-
COUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 4 (2002).  Charter schools are public schools usually
operated by non-profit providers (a few states permit for-profit providers). Charter Schools:
Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/char-
ter-schools-overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).  They are usually either independent of
the traditional local public school bureaucracy or at least able to exercise some flexibility from
the range of bureaucratic rules applicable to traditional district schools. HILL ET AL., supra, at
14.
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In addition to the fact that charters comprise barely 5% of American
public schools,89 charters, by definition, ignore the ways that traditional
district schools are operated and governed, carving out an isolated space
for experimentation that by its terms generally has no bearing on district
practice.90  Moreover, states vary widely in terms of the operational flex-
ibility actually available to charters.  Some, by rule or by practice, yield
charters in name only, requiring them to comply with the same uniform
mandates applicable to district schools.91  Others, while granting more
operational flexibility, either restrict funding available to charters92 or
deny charters access to facilities—forcing charters to use scarce operat-
ing dollars for facilities costs—in ways that, in practice, undermine a
charter’s ability to experiment with alternate governance or operational
arrangements.  Others, apparently seeking to emphasize in no uncertain
terms that these alternate programs are merely outliers, specifically limit
the number of charters that may open in a jurisdiction or in practice do so
through authorizers that infrequently approve charter applications.93
In addition to charter schools, a small number of school districts
have experimented with portfolio approaches to school governance94
and, to a lesser extent, voucher programs enabling students to attend pri-
vate schools with public funds.  Both portfolio and voucher approaches
are exceptions to the traditions described above, as students attending
89 SUSAN AUD ET AL., NATI’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCA-
TION 2012, at 22 (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=20120
45.
90 See, e.g., Brian Gill et al., Rhetoric Versus Reality: What We Know and What We
Need to Know About Vouchers and Charter Schools 2–4 (updated ed. 2007), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/RAND_MR1118-1.pdf
(noting that charter schools, unlike traditional district schools, “aim to induce reform by
changing the fundamental organization of the school system” and serve only as isolated “labo-
ratories” for reform).
91 See O’Brien, supra note 34 at 156–57 (discussing ways in which traditional con-
straints are imposed on charter schools); Ctr. for Educ. Reform, The Essential Guide to Charter
School Law: Charter School Laws Across the States 2012 (Alison Consoletti ed., 13th ed.
2012), available at http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/CER-
CharterLaws201212.21.2012.pdf (noting the differences between every state’s approach to
charter school autonomy).
92 See id. (comparing the differences in state laws in terms of their funding options for
charters, and concluding that many states do not have laws providing for fiscal equity between
charter and district schools.).
93 See, e.g., Julie Davis Bell, Charter School Caps, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Dec.
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/CharterSchoolCaps.pdf (discussing various state
and local ceilings on the number and/or growth of charter schools).
94 See Katrina E. Bulkey, Introduction—Portfolio Management Models in Urban School
Reform, in BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND THE NEW PORTFOLIO
MODELS FOR URBAN SCHOOL REFORM 3, 7 (Katrina E. Bulkey et al. eds., 2010); Kenneth J.
Saltman, Urban School Decentralization and the Growth of “Portfolio Districts”, GREAT
LAKES CTR. FOR EDUC. RES. & PRAC. (June 2010), http://greatlakescenter.org/docs/Policy_
Briefs/Saltman_PortfolioDistricts.pdf.
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either a portfolio or voucher school are exceedingly rare—dramatically
fewer, for example, than the number of students attending public char-
ters, which as discussed above is itself a small percentage.95  Moreover,
both portfolio and voucher schools largely adopt traditional approaches
to school structure, operations, and practice.
In portfolio approaches to school governance, a governance ap-
proach that a few large, urban districts are beginning to implement, dis-
trict central offices are reconfigured from the prime source of
instructional, curricular, and operational practice to an overseer of per-
formance and outcomes.  District offices become managers, in theory, of
a diverse range of school options, and a central office’s responsibility is
not to ensure compliance with central-office mandates, but uniform re-
sults in terms of student achievement.96  In theory, this approach should
lead to a greater diversity of individual schools, to the degree it relies less
on traditional command-and-control practices of central-office govern-
ance.  In practice, however, portfolio schools generally fall within the
existing web of federal, state, county, and collective-bargaining man-
dates that apply to all public schools, and so portfolio-based flexibility is
available only to the limited degree permitted by positive law.  Although
some jurisdictions purposefully exclude public charters from some num-
ber of mandates, portfolio schools, by and large, do not have that
luxury.97
Similarly, vouchers are exceedingly rare, currently in place in only a
handful of jurisdictions in the nation.98  So these programs are so uncom-
mon that they have no meaningful bearing on the reconceptualization of
structural practice in public schools.  Moreover, private schools partici-
pating in voucher programs often reproduce the structural framework of
traditional public schools, producing better outcomes not because of re-
formed institutional practices, but because of stronger inputs—school-
leader and teacher quality, students more ready to learn, after-school pro-
grams, more-engaged parents, smaller class sizes, better instructional
materials and technological aids—that mitigate the inefficiencies pro-
duced by structural practices ill-fitting the contemporary needs of
schoolchildren.99
95 See Saltman, supra note 94.
96 See Bulkey, supra note 94, at 9–12.
97 See id. at 14–15.
98 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the
Expansion of School Choice Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1933–34 (2012) (discuss-
ing exceedingly small number of jurisdictions with active voucher programs and that, even
within these limited bounds, these programs are further constrained either as “pilot” or time-
limited programs).
99 See, e.g., Harold Wenglinsky, Are Private High Schools Better Academically than
Public High Schools?, Ctr. on Educ. Pol’y, 19–21 (Oct. 2010), http://www.cep-dc.org/cfcon
tent_file.cfm?Attachment=Wenglinsky%5FReport%5FPrivateSchool%5F101007%2Epdf.
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To summarize, American public schools are standardized, first, be-
cause of the regulatory history that gave birth to American public
schools, particularly the goals of cultural assimilation motivating com-
mon schools and the assembly-line operational practices of the industrial
age.  This foundation was largely untouched during the mid-twentieth
century focus on racial integration and funding equity.  More modern
efforts premised on programmatic reform and standards-and-assessment
not only fail to revisit the structural assumptions undergirding public
schools, but largely superimpose new curricular and testing mandates on
top of pre-existing rules.  These traditional antecedents for uniformity, in
addition, are amplified by the ways in which mandate-making is intrinsic
to the modern regulatory state, factors that apply with unique force to
public education, especially for districts disproportionately serving racial
minorities.
Part II will explore the ways highly standardized public schools are
inconsistent with the expectations motivating public education today.
This Part will also discuss how education mandates undermine the very
professional discretion needed to achieve the goals of modern public
schools—goals radically different from those informing American public
schools for most of their history.
II. HEAVY MANDATES COMPROMISE THE PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION
NEEDED TO MAXIMIZE STUDENTS’ ABILITY TO OBTAIN THE
HIGHER-ORDER SKILLS REQUIRED FOR
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE MODERN,
GLOBAL ECONOMY
This Part contends, first, that education, at the levels demanded to-
day, requires a substantial amount of school-level discretion, given the
individual and ever-evolving needs of students, and because the higher-
order skills expected of today’s students are not amenable to standard-
ized pedagogy in the same way as basic skills.  This Part claims, further,
that policymakers have ignored the degree to which a window of school-
level discretion is necessary for effective education in light of today’s
skill-level expectations, and as such education mandates needlessly com-
promise school-level discretion in ways that often undermine the objec-
tives they purport to serve.
This of course does not mean that voucher programs are not beneficial for individual students.
My claim is simply that voucher programs generally do not reflect a fundamental reorientation
of school practice in light of this Article’s critiques of standardized schools.
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A. Educators Require Significant Amounts of Professional Discretion
Given the Unique Challenges of Instilling in Large Numbers of
Children the Higher-Order Skills Expected Today
The education of children is unique among the responsibilities of
government.  This is so both because children bring with them unique
and ever-evolving challenges to the educational enterprise, and because
education itself—and, more to the point, effectively instilling in young
people the skills, competencies, and values motivating public schooling
today—also presents special challenges.
Public schooling is unique, first, because it is one of the few areas in
which government assumes direct responsibility over the care, cultiva-
tion, and value inculcation of children.  Outside of foster care, in which
government takes responsibility for the entire scope of a child’s life, pub-
lic schools are unique in terms of the primary role government plays in
directing a child’s nurturing and development.  Yet unlike even the fos-
ter-care context, public education involves the cultivation and value in-
culcation of children on a mass scale.  Every state in the union requires
children to enroll in school, and for parents unable to access private
schools, the only way to comply with this mandate is to send their child
to government-run schools.100  The large majority of American children
therefore attend public schools.101
Education is distinct, in addition, because public education, as dis-
cussed earlier, is motivated by particular aims about the kind of human
beings sought to be produced by public schools—a young person who
not only has certain technical skills relevant to contemporaneous labor
markets, but who also embodies those social, cultural, and civic sensibili-
ties that public authorities have decided serve the public interest.
The uniqueness of these objectives brings equally special challenges
for the government.  First, the processes by which students internalize
information are dynamic and complex and vary from child to child.102
Children, among other things, have different learning styles and thus pro-
cess instruction differently.103  Some students learn best by seeing, and
others by doing; some children best process information through repeti-
100 See, e.g., Adriana Lleras-Muney, Were Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws
Effective?  An Analysis from 1915 to 1939, 45 J.L. & ECON. 401, 403 (2002).
101 See AUD ET AL., supra note 89, at 24 (“Some 10 percent of all elementary and secon- R
dary school students were in private schools in 2009–10 . . . .”).
102 See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE IN-
TELLIGENCES (1983) (arguing that there are a wide range of cognitive abilities); Susan S.
Stodolsky & Pamela L. Grossman, Changing Students, Changing Teaching, 102 TCHRS. C.
REC. 125 (2000) (discussing the changing racial and ethnic composition of students in United
States as a reason to rethink traditional teaching methods).
103 See GARDNER, supra note 102. R
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tion—others by applying knowledge to real-world situations.104  For
some students, these differences in learning styles may rise to the level of
diagnosable special education disabilities, triggering special legal
processes that, among other things, presumptively require children with
disabilities to be taught alongside general education students, and thus
require general education teachers to respond to these distinct needs as
well.105  In addition, a child’s receptivity to instruction also varies based
on the particulars of the child’s economic, social, and cultural
conditions.106
Second, the difficulty of teaching students in ways that respond to
their diverse learning styles is amplified because a student’s responsive-
ness to teaching is ever-evolving.107  Neither children nor the way they
process instruction is static.  Instead, children are continually evolving
physically, socially, and emotionally throughout their school-age
years.108  Each of these factors affect a child’s receptivity to learning,
and each situates a child differently, at different points in their develop-
ment, for instruction.  In addition to transformations arising from a
child’s personal maturation, the conditions in which children find them-
selves change regularly, often dramatically.  For instance, the death of a
parent, a caregiver’s loss of income, the illness of a loved one, and other
familial or community disruptions can alter a child’s receptivity to learn-
ing, often in ways that are not obvious to others, but usually in ways that
require tailored pedagogical interventions.109
Third, and especially important today, the technical skills required
for success in the twenty-first century require high levels of critical
thinking, reasoning, and analysis, raising the bar on the rigor of instruc-
tion and thus the rigor of the instructional methods.110  The twin engines
104 Id.
105 To the maximum extent possible, IDEA requires students with disabilities to be taught
in a general-education classroom.  Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004
§ 612(a)(5)(A), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006).
106 See, e.g., PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS: AND OTHER REFLEC-
TIONS ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 18 (2008); DARLING-HAM-
MOND, supra note 36, at 13 (recognizing need for teachers to instruct students R
improvisationally to meet their diverse and evolving needs).
107 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 2, at 218 (“Because each student is achieving mas- R
tery by applying an idiosyncratic bundle of skills, the teacher’s job is to find ways of continu-
ously assessing each student’s assembly of strategies and to suggest new ones for overcoming
the weaknesses.”).
108 Id. at 215–18.
109 See, e.g., id. at 215 (emphasizing the need for individualized learning because children
are “incorrigibly idiosyncratic”).
110 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK 111
(expanded ed. 2012) (“[W]e need our education system not only to strengthen everyone’s
basics . . . but to teach and inspire all Americans to start something new, to add something
extra, or to adapt something old in whatever job they are doing.”).
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of globalization and information technology have radically changed con-
temporary labor markets and, correspondingly, the skills required for
graduates to effectively navigate current labor markets.111  In this new
“flat world,” to use Thomas Friedman’s metaphor, the ability to think,
create, innovate, and adapt—along with dexterity in science and mathe-
matics—are essential to the twenty-first century competitiveness of
individuals.112
These higher-order analytical skills, moreover, require a different
kind of teaching than that informing the agricultural and manufacturing
skills needed historically for prior labor markets.113  Industrial-age labor
markets, as discussed above, required workers able to manage the highly
standardized, assembly-line factory positions that drove the contempora-
neous economy.114  These skills, which emphasize repetition and uni-
formity, are amenable to discretion-free instructional methods in ways
that are not true for the more cognitively rigorous skill set relevant to
modern labor markets.115
The large number of children served by individual teachers and
schools compound these three factors.  Teachers face classrooms ranging
from twenty to twenty-five students, and often many more, with each
child representing his or her own special combination of the factors dis-
cussed above.  An individual teacher thus confronts not only the difficul-
ties inherent in teaching higher-order skills and prescribed civic virtues
to children who present evolving availabilities for learning, but also the
challenge of managing each individual child and his or her individual
complexities along with twenty or twenty-five others, who each bring
their own idiosyncratic context to bear on the learning process.
For these reasons, among others, school-level educators require sub-
stantial amounts of professional discretion to effectively instill in stu-
dents the higher-order technical skills expected of modern public
schools.116  Principals and schools need the flexibility to tailor curricu-
111 Id. at 56 (“This merger [of globalization and the IT revolution that coincided with the
transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century] has raised the level of skill a person
needs to obtain and retain any good job, while at the same time increasing the global competi-
tion for every one of those jobs.”).
112 Id. at 104–05 (noting that “continuous innovation is not a luxury anymore” and com-
panies must “practice constant innovation” or “fall behind farther and faster than ever
before.”); see also DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 237–38. R
113 See, e.g., id. at 237–39 (demonstrating ways that competitive requirements of the flat
world require a teaching method fundamentally different from that at work in the Common
School and Progressive Eras).
114 See supra Introduction.
115 See id.
116 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 218–19, 237–41; see also CHUBB & MOE, R
supra note 69, at 36 (emphasizing the need, in light of modern expectations of public schools,
for educators to have the discretion to tailor their practice “to the infinitely varying individuals
and circumstances that make up their jobs”).
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lum, instruction, and assessment in ways that respond to the learning
styles represented by the students in a school or classroom.117  Too much
standardization thus yields a round-peg-in-square-hole problem, where
rule-dominant educational practices preclude schools from adapting edu-
cational practices to students’ individual needs.
Likewise, the ever-evolving nature of students’ receptivity to learn-
ing means that educators face dynamic school and classroom environ-
ments where what was effective yesterday may be ineffective tomorrow.
In such a fluid environment, professional discretion enables educators to
flexibly adapt their practices to the diverse circumstances they face each
day.
Discretion-stripping thus tends to freeze in place educational prac-
tices that not only fail to meet the individualized needs of many students
but also outlive their usefulness.  A rule requiring the use of a particular
lesson plan for reading instruction, for example, may at some point be
useful for some number of kids.  But as kids evolve, that particular man-
date may no longer meet their needs.  Yet a mandate requiring the con-
tinuing use of that reading program, regardless of a principal’s or
teacher’s view about the continuing utility of that program for the af-
fected students, locks into place a practice that both fails to meet the
needs of many kids in the first instance, and that, over time, outlives its
usefulness for others.
The connection between school-based professional discretion and
higher-order skill development is so strong that the distribution of profes-
sional discretion corresponds to the distribution of educational opportu-
nity in many ways.118  For example, racial and class-based differences in
school performance, in some ways, reflect the distribution of profes-
sional discretion of the better trained and better qualified educators
charged with teaching the privileged elite for whom high-skill training is
desired.119  In contrast, the broad mass of students trained to serve as
cogs in the industrial age manufacturing economy typically receive a
more standardized educational experience in which professional discre-
tion is less important precisely to the degree to which high-skill training
is unimportant.120
117 See, e.g., John S. Wills & Judith Haymore Sandholtz, Constrained Professionalism:
Dilemmas of Teaching in the Face of Test-Based Accountability, 111 TCHRS. C. REC. 1065,
1108 (2009) (finding that “teachers’ discretion in their work is being minimized,” which has
negative effects for student learning).
118 See, e.g., DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 36, at 9 (discussing how rote drill and prac- R
tice instruction characterizes lower-performing schools, while more professionalized discre-
tionary practice characterizes higher-performing ones).
119 See Beatty, supra note 11 (describing ways in which scripted, discretion-preempting R
curricula are disproportionately imposed in schools where the majority of students come from
low-income backgrounds).
120 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 36, at 4–5. R
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Finally, the multiplier effect of the number of students in class-
rooms and schools magnifies the importance of professional discretion.
The aggregated needs of students, in terms of their learning styles, the
ever-evolving nature of their receptivity to learning, and the different
ways in which they learn higher-order skills cannot be met without sig-
nificant amounts of professional discretion.  Moreover, discretion-strip-
ping uniform rules do not permit nimble responsiveness to the diverse,
evolving ways in which individual students, placed within a larger group
of students, respond to instruction.
Principals and teachers require a meaningful amount of professional
discretion to achieve the ambitious goals expected of today’s public
schools.  Yet the need for a discretionary space effectively free from in-
flexible mandates at both the school and classroom level does not neces-
sarily imply that across-the-board rules should never be imposed.  Rules
are not only important but, as discussed further in Part III, are necessary
in many instances.  Rules, among other things, ensure that schools re-
main “public” in terms of their fidelity to core civic values.  Moreover,
when crafted appropriately, rules ensure that public schools act consist-
ently with the best educational practices and protect against the incompe-
tent or biased delivery of educational services.  Thus, the harm to the
public school system does not come from modern educational rules
themselves but from the degree to which these rules counterproductively
extend into spheres better left to professional discretion.  The prolifera-
tion of overbroad and ill-fitting mandates built on historic traditions
leaves individual schools and classrooms facing a morass of rules that
too often bear little relation to effective educational practice.  These rules
undermine the capacity of individual public schools, and thus the public
school system as a whole, to deliver on the promises of public schooling.
B. The Need for Professional Discretion Rarely Informs Education
Decision Making, Let Alone Rulemaking, so Education Policy
Infrequently Takes the Need for Discretion into Account
Although educators need a significant amount of professional dis-
cretion to fulfill the goals motivating today’s public schools, policymak-
ers, ranging from those in federal, state, and county governments to those
in local school districts and those in management and labor through col-
lective-bargaining agreements, rarely recognize the tension between rules
and professional discretion and the direct relationship between this ten-
sion and the ability of public schools to effectively educate children in
light of current expectations.  Educational policymakers rarely identify
the degree to which their rules undermine discretion and the reasons why
those costs are outweighed by the benefits of standardization.  As a re-
sult, educational rules seldom account for the tension between rules and
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discretion, and yield mandates that either affect entire subject areas that
should be left to the professional discretion of educators or, where a sub-
ject area is appropriate for regulation, counterproductively extend into
spheres better left to professional discretion.
The overbroad nature of educational mandates reflects policymak-
ers’ failure to meaningfully acknowledge the particular ways in which
professional discretion is important for public schools to achieve their
goals.  This shortfall also demonstrates how policymakers have failed to
articulate a vision of the appropriate way to balance the use of education
mandates with the use of school-level discretion.  The absence of such a
vision causes education mandates to operate recklessly, without an
anchoring theory to distribute mandates to the areas in which they would
be most useful and to preserve professional school-level discretion in
areas in which flexibility is important.
To this end, Part III provides an approach to educational rulemaking
that, first, acknowledges the need for a meaningful amount of school-
based professional discretion in order for public school students to obtain
the higher-order skills expected of them today.  Second, Part III offers an
intellectual framework to guide policymakers in crafting education man-
dates that effectively balance uniformity and discretion.
III. REORIENTING EDUCATION POLICYMAKING TOWARD PURPOSEFUL
RULEMAKING THAT EFFECTIVELY BALANCES MANDATES AND
DISCRETION, GIVEN THE UNIQUE IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETION
TO EFFECTIVE MODERN-DAY EDUCATION
This Part provides a set of principles to guide rule makers, first, in
determining when across-the-board mandates are appropriate and, sec-
ond, in crafting rules that effectively balance the important and often
essential benefits of mandates with the significant and often necessary
benefits of school and classroom discretion.  Specifically, I suggest that
policymakers, as a threshold matter, should consider whether the subject
matter covered by a proposed mandate is one for which across-the-board
rulemaking is appropriate.  Here I distinguish between regulatory-zone
subjects, for which mandates are generally appropriate, and discretion-
ary-zone subjects, for which they are not.  However, even when a subject
matter falls within the regulatory zone, policymakers should carefully
craft mandates that specifically focus on regulatory-zone purposes and
do not needlessly impinge upon discretionary-zone prerogatives.
First, policymakers should limit education mandates to four discrete
sets of categories in which rule-based uniformity routinely outweighs the
benefits of discretion.  These categories concern: (1) matters involving
fundamental public values that apply to all government institutions; (2)
matters concerning fundamental public values unique to education; (3)
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matters for which an overwhelming consensus of experts finds that a
particular practice is necessary to effectively educate a broad majority of
students; and (4) emergent, time-limited situations in which individual
staff are too incompetent to effectively exercise discretion and mandates
can replace professional discretion for a fixed, temporary period.
Rulemaking is appropriate, first, to ensure that schools uphold core
public priorities that generally apply to all government institutions.
These values reflect priorities that are fundamental to the way in which
government interacts with citizens, involving among other things, the
most hallowed traditions of American law—due process, equal protec-
tion, non-discrimination, the accommodation of individuals with disabili-
ties, free speech, and access to public records and public facilities.  These
values also include less lofty, but nonetheless vital interests, such as
health and safety, environmental protection obligations, instrumental pri-
orities like plain English requirements for rulemaking, and mandates to
publish public information electronically.  Broad-based civic imperatives
that universally apply to government conduct should generally apply
with equal force to schools because these values embody the core foun-
dational principles through which American government discharges its
responsibilities.  Recognizing the legitimacy of mandates in this sphere
effectively acknowledges that rules covered by this category are not fun-
damentally education mandates but rather core democratic imperatives
that embody the foundational values that inform government action.
Second, education discretion-stripping mandates are appropriate to
fulfill fundamental public purposes unique to education.  Of these, the
outcomes pursued by public schools are the most obvious because
schools must maintain uniform core educational goals to be “public” in
any meaningful sense.  Government finances schools to achieve public
purposes and those purposes must constrain public schools’ activities.  It
is thus not only justified, but in fact necessary, for government to identify
the goals and expectations of public schools in terms of the values that
schools ought to embody as public institutions and the kind of skills and
sensibilities public school students ought to possess.  Mandates falling
within this second category include government directives concerning
public school outcomes, including standards covering the kind of aca-
demic skills and civic values graduating students ought to possess.  This
category also includes state mandates covering the courses, knowledge,
and competencies expected of students at various grade levels.  Testing
also falls under this purview, as a constituent part of determining the
outcomes and purposes of public education is the ability to determine
whether those goals have been achieved.
In addition to these first two regulatory zone categories, I also sug-
gest a narrow third category authorizing policymakers to require the use
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of best practices supported by the irrefutable consensus of educational
experts.  To be clear, this authority is narrow and should only be em-
ployed when a broad consensus of education experts empirically finds
that a particular practice is necessary for the effective education of a
large majority of students.  If, for example, a broad consensus of educa-
tional experts empirically finds that students need at least three hours of
instruction to obtain the skills expected of them, then this principle justi-
fies a corresponding rule.  Likewise, if a broad consensus empirically
concludes that prospective teachers require a college degree in order to
effectively wield discretion to advance student achievement, a corre-
sponding rule should also apply.
Professional activity is subject to constant reflection, study, and re-
search on the best practices.  Accordingly, this third category recognizes
an obvious justification for mandates—imposing methodological uni-
formity where overwhelming evidence reveals that the most effective
means of accomplishing an objective is through a particular course of
action.  While a substantial amount of learning cannot be fostered by
across-the-board rulemaking, the converse is also true.  Thus, mandates
are generally justified when a clear, unquestionable factual basis supports
implementing a specific practice.  This authority, however, must be used
carefully and infrequently, recognizing that methodological practices are
rarely supported by an unambiguous predicate that justifies universal
application.
Finally, mandates are appropriate on an emergency basis to con-
strain the discretion of educational staff incapable of effectively dis-
charging professional discretion.  This authority recognizes the power to
remove discretion from specific employees who have not shown the ca-
pacity to effectively use professional discretion to promote the goals of
public education.  However, this power may only be implemented by
policymakers who maintain the most regular contact with affected dis-
tricts or schools.  Moreover, this power should rarely, if ever, be exer-
cised by state authorities and should never be implemented by federal
authorities.  Since competence justification is only directed at the partic-
ular areas in which competence is a challenge, it will not be a source for
wide-ranging discretion-stripping based on indiscriminate assumptions
about school-based competence or, even worse, stereotypical bias about
district or school-based capacity, a particular challenge faced by districts
serving racial minorities.121
This category is narrow and discrete because competence-based dis-
cretion-stripping is a crude and ultimately counterproductive way of ad-
121 See generally supra Part I (discussing stereotypical views government actors often
have about the competence of district and school-based staff serving minority students, partic-
ularly where the supervisory leadership is primarily minority).
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dressing performance-related challenges.  Since effective education
requires educators who posses a high level of professional discretionary
skill, public schools cannot escape the necessity of attracting, develop-
ing, and retaining highly skilled and competent educators.  Thus, this
source of authority must be used only on an emergent, targeted basis,
where the incompetence of specific school-based staff leaves particular
students more vulnerable to poor instruction than rule-based uniformity
would.  This competence justification would, for example, support spe-
cific directives to require particular educators to use specified instruc-
tional materials or lesson plans on a short-term basis if local supervisors
find them incapable of delivering instruction proficiently with greater
discretion.
The competence justification would also support the imposition of
particular teacher evaluation criteria and instruments if, for example, par-
ticular school leaders were found incapable of effectively evaluating staff
in more discretionary ways.122  This approach would also validate rule-
based seniority mandates regarding key personnel decisions in cases
where individual educators were found incapable of effectively making
personnel decisions—such as those involving hiring, salary, and termina-
tions—in ways that best serve the individual needs of students.  Again,
the most important aspect of the competence justification approach is
that these decisions are both short-term and specific.  The short-term as-
pect of the competence justification approach recognizes the necessity of
professionally exercised discretion and, thus, acknowledges that compe-
tence justification is not a substitute for hiring staff with the skills to
effectively use that discretion.  Moreover, the specificity requirement
recognizes that discretion-stripping rules in this context should be based
on particular findings about individual staff rather than on indiscriminate
mandates informed by general assumptions about local capacity.
While these four categories represent subject matter for which man-
dates are justified, policymakers charged with regulating these areas
must carefully tailor their regulations in light of these objectives to en-
sure that rulemaking does not sweep beyond these legitimate goals.  For
example, a rule designed to enact a universal civic imperative applicable
throughout government, such as a mandate requiring nondiscrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, ought to be crafted to only advance
122 To be clear, teacher evaluation criteria might also be justified by the regulatory-zone
justification for mandates where a broad consensus of education experts support a particular
set of practices.  Yet, the more particularized teacher evaluation criteria become (for example,
requiring an administrator to evaluate a teacher based on a predetermined rubric that assigns
weights to various competences), the more likely they are to fall into an area where a more
debatable consensus of experts support the practice.  To that extent, using the competence
justification as a backstop would support further regulation to the degree that particular staff
members are incapable of effectively using professional discretion.
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that interest and should not needlessly interfere with other interests, ex-
cept for those falling within the same regulatory zone.  This principle
simply acknowledges longstanding jurisprudential questions concerning
tailoring and recognizes that only those rules that are tightly tethered to
their purposes can reasonably be regarded as embodying those goals.123
Education practices falling outside of these four regulatory zone cat-
egories generally ought to be left to school-based discretion.  Regulatory-
zone subjects, save for exceptions justifying the adaptation of method-
ological uniformity to advance broadly recognized best practices or to
relieve specific areas of staff incompetence on a short-term basis, gener-
ally concern the outcomes of public education.  The means individual
schools use to pursue the goals and purposes of public schools, as deter-
mined by regulatory-zone mandates, broadly ought to be left to the pro-
fessional discretion of school-based educators.  These instrumental
practices fall within the discretionary-zone and should generally be free
from across-the-board rulemaking precisely because these practices gen-
erally depend upon the organic, flexible, and proficient use of discretion
in relation to individual, ever-changing student needs.
Discretionary-zone practices concern the heart of school-based
staffs’ instructional and pedagogical interaction with students and in-
clude: the selection of curricular tools; the selection of instructional
methods or techniques that are best able to engage a particular student or
set of students; the amount of time particular students or sets of students
need to proficiently internalize required skills; how many staff members
ought to be assigned to a particular set of students for those students to
progress academically; and the ways in which school-based administra-
tors, such as principals, vice-principals, and department chairs, support
and supervise teachers and other school-based staff in pursuit of school
outcomes.  These practices are currently heavily regulated, and uniform-
123 Due to the important interests at stake, constitutional law uses narrow tailoring to
ensure that the government pursues legitimate purposes using means that are closely related to
those purposes. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (noting that all racial
classifications imposed by the government must be “narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests”); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting
that the government can restrict protected speech as long as the restrictions are narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest and leave open alternative channels of com-
munication).  The proximity between legitimate purpose and regulatory scope largely turns on
whether an individual or governmental interest holds more sway in a particular context.  Thus,
as it relates to an individual right to be free from racial discrimination, constitutional law
requires an exceedingly tight link under the narrow tailoring jurisprudence between means and
purpose. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.  In contrast, because constitutional law empha-
sizes the government’s ability to regulate broadly on economic matters, individual rights in
this context, for example, are less weighty and constitutional law grants government a wider
regulatory authority. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(noting that the Equal Protection Clause grants states wide discretion when economic legisla-
tion is at issue).
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ity in these instances is necessarily counterproductive because it attempts
to routinize the unpredictable.  Decisions affecting discretionary-zone
practices involve dynamic and evolving human interactions for which
there is no substitute for effectively trained professionals who understand
which particular approach, from a range of permissible approaches, best
suits a particular student or particular sets of students at a particular time.
In short, these situations demand qualified educators and no rule or man-
date can systematically replicate the professional craft and judgment of a
well-trained professional educator.
CONCLUSION
Education policymakers should engage in purposeful rulemaking
that specifically considers the appropriateness of education mandates in
light of the need for appropriate levels of school-based professional dis-
cretion.  This is particularly important now, given the intense public and
political interest in improving student outcomes that has fueled a grow-
ing number of education mandates.  Policymakers’ failure to recognize
the educational necessity of meaningful school-based discretion has
caused them to ignore the implications of across-the-board discretion-
stripping school mandates.  More importantly, this oversight has caused
policymakers to fail to consider whether those effects undermine profes-
sional discretion in ways that compromise student outcomes.
To be clear, this framework does not suggest that educational man-
dates are inherently bad or good.  Instead this framework allocates rules
to areas that will be strengthened by the application of educational man-
dates and keeps rules out of those areas in which mandates are unhelpful
and counterproductive.  This framework, of course, is no panacea; it will
not always yield ideal results, nor will it alone ensure that schools will
produce greater student outcomes.  What this framework provides, how-
ever, is a set of principles aimed at rebalancing the relationship between
uniformity and school-based discretion in education law and policy to
better meet the contemporary needs of modern American public schools.
Today’s uniformity–discretion continuum largely reflects a prior or-
dering rooted in Common School and Progressive Era perspectives re-
garding school performance, which themselves were based on historical
expectations about student achievement and the purposes of education.
Yet today, because schools are expected to prepare students for a highly
competitive, technologically advanced, and evolving international labor
market, more highly qualified and trained educators are required to use
their discretion and professional training to effectively pursue student
outcomes.
Rules are good and necessary as far as they are useful and produc-
tive.  As previously discussed, they are essential in anchoring the out-
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comes sought by public schools, ensuring that public schools uphold core
public priorities, tethering public schools to indisputably beneficial best
practices, and providing a backstop function in areas where specific staff
are incapable of effectively using discretion.  However, mandates can
only go so far and alone cannot yield public schools that are responsive
to the demands of today’s public and current labor markets.
Given the exigencies of an international economy driven by global
competition and technological change, the gap between mandates and
effective education can only be filled by competent, highly skilled pro-
fessional educators who are prepared to use their discretion to achieve
the objectives of today’s schools.  This requires policymakers to forego
grafting new rules and approaches onto a mandate-based foundation that
has its roots in an entirely different context.  Modern school objectives
require policymakers to reimagine public schools in light of current ex-
pectations and enact laws that serve those expectations by recognizing
the appropriate place for education rules and the residual space that must
be reserved for professional discretion.
This Article seeks to participate in a conversation about the relation-
ship of law and discretion to public schools.  Even if others critique my
particular account or reject it altogether, I hope that this piece will engen-
der a renewed consideration of the role of mandates and discretion in
schools in light of the heightened expectations for today’s graduates and
spur policymakers to think purposefully and specifically about the dis-
cretion-stripping implications of mandates, both in determining whether
to enact a particular mandate in the first place and in crafting its scope.
